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NO. 1 FEBRUARY 2019  Introduction 
European Defence – Debates in and 
about Poland and France 
Think Tank Publications 2017/2018 
Lena Strauß and Nicolas Lux 
In 2017, the foreign and defence ministers of almost all EU countries decided to estab-
lish a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) for European Union defence policy. 
The debates at think tanks in EU Member States about this initiative show that expec-
tations regarding a European defence architecture diverge widely and focus on very 
different issues. This is especially true for Poland and France. In Poland, European 
defence policy is primarily understood as a form of collective defence against Russia 
which needs to be integrated into the NATO framework. For France, on the other 
hand, risks to its very own security and that of Europe come primarily from its south-
ern neighbours. This is why Paris attaches particular importance to the development 
of military intervention capabilities. These differing preferences of Germany’s two 
largest and most important neighbouring countries are reflected clearly in the scien-
tific analyses and comments by European think tanks on questions of European arma-
ments policy and the further integration of European defence policy. 
 
A look at the debates in European think 
tank publications on the Common Defence 
and Security Policy (CDSP) reveals that the 
preferences of EU Member States in this 
policy area vary widely. The differences 
become particularly visible when the ben-
efits of the new Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO), which 25 EU Member 
States signed up to in 2017, are discussed 
in the field of security and defence. Within 
the framework of PESCO, the participating 
states should, among other things, “develop 
jointly defence capabilities, [...] enhance the 
operational readiness and contribution of 
their armed forces”, as stated in the EU’s 
official statement (note: scientific classifi-
cations of PESCO and comments on this 
initiative can be found in the list of Publi-
cations Reviewed and in Further Reading 
at the end of this Journal Review). The 
differences in PESCO’s assessment are 
particularly evident if one looks at a selec-
tion of think tank publications published 
since 2017 that mainly focus on the atti-
tudes of France and Poland towards this 
process. In particular, many analyses 
come from these two – but also other – 
countries refer directly to the divergent 
defence policy interests of the other EU 
member. 
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The aim of this Journal Review is to 
compare the different problem perceptions, 
interests and policy recommendations in 
publications with regard to Poland and 
France, and to classify them into the Euro-
pean discourse on defence policy. The 
publications examined here were selected 
according to two criteria: Firstly, analyses 
and comments written by researchers from 
French and Polish think tanks were chosen 
and complemented by publications from 
think tankers from other EU Member States 
in order to include an internal and external 
perspective on the debates taking place. 
Secondly, publications were included that 
looked into the new developments in Euro-
pean defence policy that have occurred 
since 2017. These include publicly available 
policy briefs, analyses and comments. The 
following sections on discussions relating 
to Poland and France also address EU insti-
tutional factors and integration aspects, 
as well as their defence and armaments 
dimensions. Most of the articles discussed 
here have dealt with these broader issues. 
Poland: The NATO Alliance 
as a First Priority 
The Polish debate reveals a distanced rela-
tionship to an increasingly integrated EU 
defence policy. 
Justyna Gotkowska of the Polish Centre 
for Eastern Studies (OSW) could not find 
almost any helpful approaches in recent 
EU defence policy initiatives, such as 
PESCO, that might actually further advance 
the European integration process. She 
concludes that PESCO is not an appropriate 
EU response to new global and regional 
challenges in security policy, as PESCO con-
tains the unsolved strategic contradiction 
between the preferences of Germany and 
those of France. While Berlin pursues an 
inclusive and integrative policy approach 
to defence issues, France’s priorities are 
more in favour of an exclusive and mili-
tarily effective EU defence policy. If expec-
tations of PESCO to promote integration do 
not materialise, the likely result is further 
European fragmentation in this policy area. 
According to Gotkowska, the differences in 
the strategic culture of EU Member States 
could even widen, in particular between 
key players within the Union, including 
France, Germany and Poland. While Paris 
localises threats to its own and European 
security interests in North Africa, Warsaw 
focuses on securing Europe’s eastern flank, 
which extends from the Baltic Sea through 
Poland to Romania. The author diagnoses 
an over-focusing on PESCO and an EU tip-
toeing away from the transatlantic alliance. 
She suggests that this development weakens 
the credibility of NATO’s military deter-
rence from Russia and, thus, poses a threat 
to Poland’s security interests. For example, 
the debate that often takes place among 
European experts about US disengagement 
from Europe and NATO structures, which is 
based primarily on the rhetoric of US Presi-
dent Trump, is in fact misleading. Only this 
talk of a potential US departure, which 
would require an intensified European 
defence policy on the part of Western EU 
Member States, could possibly trigger an 
actual withdrawal of the US from Europe. 
This discourse has, therefore, been met 
with great scepticism – not only in Poland, 
but also in the states along NATO’s eastern 
flank and in the remaining Visegrád Group 
countries (V4): the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Slovakia. 
Marcin Terlikowski of the Polish Insti-
tute of International Affairs (PISM) looks 
more positively at European security and 
defence policy. He emphasises the political 
importance of PESCO but, at the same time, 
criticises tendencies of exclusion of the 
states of Central and Eastern Europe with 
weaker defence industries. As a result, 
he writes, European security and defence 
policy risks becoming an elitist, Western 
European project. He recommends that 
Warsaw instead focus on transatlantic 
relations and NATO as well as on closing 
Europe’s military capacity gaps by partici-
pating in PESCO projects. For Poland, it is of 
fundamental strategic importance to avoid 
duplicating EU and NATO structures and 
that PESCO remains inclusive and binding 
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at the same time. Warsaw should, there-
fore, press for PESCO projects to be closely 
coordinated with NATO planning processes 
and make use of the opportunities which 
certain PESCO projects might offer, such as 
improving military mobility. These plans 
coincide with NATO’s complementary goal 
of strengthening Poland’s territorial and 
alliance defence capabilities. 
In a publication for the European Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Marcin 
Zaborowski highlights Polish interests on 
armaments and defence issues. Zaborowski 
identifies a number of problems confront-
ing Warsaw that counteract deepening 
European integration in this area: Former 
Polish governments, and also the current 
one, have relied almost exclusively on the 
US and the US defence industry to equip 
their country’s armed forces since the end 
of the Cold War. This would explain the 
lack of integration in the Polish defence 
industry compared to other European coun-
tries. However, he writes that this should 
be viewed in an increasingly problematic 
environment in which the European secu-
rity architecture is facing major challenges 
stemming from aggressive Russian foreign 
policy, an unstable alliance with the US and 
a fast-approaching Brexit. Zaborowski also 
sees the Polish defence sector as increasing-
ly in need of structural reform, since it is 
predominantly state-owned and grappling 
with major efficiency and cost issues. He 
suggests that these deficits are exacerbated 
by Warsaw’s lack of a long-term strategy on 
armaments issues. Its unquestioned pref-
erence for US defence providers too often 
actually undermines Polish interests, as 
there has been no knowledge transfer from 
which Polish industry could have benefitted 
from over the long term. Also, the Polish 
government has so far generally awarded 
its arms contracts without considering 
issues of compatibility with other EU part-
ners. This also isolates Poland within its 
preferred regional framework, the V4 group, 
whose other member states have already 
benefitted from a diversified European 
arms market in many ways. If, however, 
Warsaw were to become more amenable 
to trading on the European arms market, 
this could represent a risk to its state-domi-
nated domestic defence industry. Never-
theless, Zaborowski argues that the Polish 
government must recognise and exploit 
opportunities for deeper European defence 
integration. He suggests that a greater com-
mitment to European defence policy could 
benefit Poland to a further extent given 
that the EU is currently very critical of War-
saw in other areas of politics, notably the 
rule of law and intra-European solidarity. 
Karolina Muti of the Italian Istituto 
Affari Internazionali (IAI), also identifies 
Poland as the missing link in a European 
defence and armaments structure. Muti 
asserts that Warsaw primarily sees itself 
as a loyal transatlantic partner, giving full 
priority to its relations with the US as a 
protecting power and to the US defence 
industry. Muti perceives the US’s growing 
unreliability as particularly problematic and 
believes Warsaw should respond with a 
clear policy of rapprochement with the EU 
and its Member States. Poland will not only 
benefit materially and financially from effec-
tive and substantial participation in the dif-
ferent PESCO projects, but will also be able 
to increase political credibility at EU level. 
Warsaw would then be able to take on the 
promising role of acting like a bridge be-
tween the different strategic interests of 
Western and Eastern Europe. Realigning its 
focus on EU partners would also give Poland 
the opportunity to modernise its military re-
sources (industry and armaments). Although 
Muti accepts the fear expressed by many in 
Poland that initiatives such as PESCO could 
lead to the undesired duplication of struc-
tures that already exist within NATO, she 
believes that the risk of this happening could 
be averted if Warsaw were to embrace a 
policy of broad and active participation. 
France: Reform Ambitions inside 
and outside the EU Framework 
Analyses of think tanks looking at France’s 
preferences and perceptions on defence and 
armaments policy primarily deal with Presi-
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dent Emmanuel Macron, who has been in 
power since 2017, and his lofty ambitions 
for European policy reform. However, in 
doing so, they come across some contradic-
tions they outline in their research publi-
cations. 
In his contribution to an anthology by 
the Institut de Recherche Stratégique et 
de l’École Militaire (IRSEM) in Paris, Pierre 
Haroche highlights the “geostrategic 
dilemma” he believes EU Member States 
face. The dominant threat perceptions in 
Poland are thoroughly incompatible with 
those of France. He writes that Poland is 
spellbound by fears of Russia on the eastern 
European flank, whereas France is turning 
its full gaze to Europe’s southern flank 
because it fears increasing migration pres-
sure from Africa. The two countries not 
only define their national security interests 
differently, but also have completely differ-
ent defence policies as a result. According 
to Haroche, other factors that add to the 
divergence in security interests between 
Poland and France and have a lasting im-
pact on the European defence debate in-
clude the election of Donald Trump, stricter 
fiscal discipline in the EU since the finan-
cial and government debt crises, threats 
from terrorism, the migration crisis, Rus-
sia’s aggressive self-assertion on the inter-
national stage and the impending with-
drawal of the UK from the EU. But Haroche 
views the complexity of current security 
risks as an opportunity for progress on 
European defence policy and further sug-
gests that it represents a good basis for 
PESCO to act as an integrative element. The 
European geostrategic dilemma could be 
resolved if the divergent interests were to 
be evened out and the different priorities 
mutually recognised, i.e. if the EU states 
were to achieve a ‘transactional solidarity’. 
He suggests that the conditions for achiev-
ing this were also present at the military 
level where different capabilities were 
required for crisis operations in the South 
and for NATO’s military presence in the 
East. As a result, France and Poland, al-
though at opposite ends of the defence 
policy spectrum, could act as a counter-
balance on European conflicts of interest 
and assume leadership roles to successfully 
manage the balancing act between remain-
ing loyal to NATO, their own national pri-
orities and the sometimes conflicting prior-
ities at the European level. 
Jean-Dominique Giuliani, Chairman of 
the Fondation Robert Schuman, comment-
ed on the high expectations in Parisian 
defence and security policy circles for a 
“powerful Europe” in a policy paper published 
by the research institute in May 2018. How-
ever, those striving for such a Europe 
should not only look at EU structures, but 
also at decidedly military formats outside 
EU institutions. Giuliani sees the establish-
ment of PESCO as an, albeit late, “awaken-
ing” of Europe. Franco-German relations, 
to which Giuliani attaches great importance 
in his comments, are vital for forthcoming 
developments in the field of European 
defence policy. However, as the author goes 
on to point out, compromises enforced by 
Germany because of its preference for 
PESCO to be as inclusive and integrative as 
possible have prompted the French to look 
for defence cooperation projects outside EU 
structures as well, one of which is the Euro-
pean Intervention Initiative (EI2), announced 
by Macron in his Sorbonne speech in Sep-
tember 2017. The EI2 enabled France to 
better represent its security interests in 
the southern neighbourhood. According 
to Giuliani, the EI2 format will also make 
it possible to further integrate the UK into 
a European security architecture – even 
after Brexit. However, the different per-
ceptions of the security situation and the 
disparate strategic orientation of foreign 
and security policy among the EU Member 
States remain a key issue. The realisation 
of a common “strategic culture” in Europe, 
which is indispensable for France, would 
thus be made even more difficult. 
Barbara Kunz from the Institut Français 
des Relations Internationales (ifri) in Paris 
expresses her mixed expectations of Euro-
pean defence policy in an article for the 
German Marshall Fund (GMF). Like Haroche 
and Giuliani, she too paints a picture of a 
European defence policy in crisis having to 
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assert itself against a background of the 
US under Trump, looming Brexit and the 
migration debate. Kunz mentions three 
factors that could cause the required Ger-
man and French engines of change to 
‘stall’: the East-South debate, the debate on 
Europe’s strategic autonomy and the state 
of transatlantic relations. She argues that 
Germany and France are pursuing different 
priorities in all areas, despite having a 
similar assessment of the situation. France 
would not shy away from unilateral action, 
if no option for action at the European level 
was available. However, Paris usually tries 
afterwards to embed its approach in multi-
lateral European formats. The German 
method is less targeted and strategically 
unambitious, as Kunz asserts. However, this 
approach is usually met with incomprehen-
sion and irritation from the French side. 
But, ultimately, Kunz continues, the two 
driving forces in the EU need to agree on 
a bilateral level in order to avoid further 
divergence within the Union. At the same 
time, however, there is a need for more 
intensive and expanded strategic discussion 
on how to deal with NATO and other for-
mats outside EU structures (including the 
EI2) and how their respective national 
interests and priorities could be recognised 
to ensure that PESCO can be jointly im-
plemented for long-term success. 
In a policy brief also published by the 
GMF, Alice Pannier assigns France the 
important position of a mediator. She 
writes that it is up to France to strengthen 
its strong security and defence links with 
the UK in the future European security 
architecture after Brexit. In addition, Paris 
must prioritise EU initiatives in this area 
over other unilateral and bilateral projects, 
since this is the only way for the EU to 
develop and pursue a coherent and con-
sistent approach. According to Pannier, the 
area of tension in which France finds itself 
is determined not only by relations with 
NATO, ad hoc intervention formats and 
PESCO, but also by the close bilateral and, 
therefore, potentially risky arms coopera-
tion with the UK. On a strategic level, there 
may be greater convergence with London 
than with (most) other European partners. 
However, the integration and institutionali-
sation of European defence (and arms) policy 
would be a more attractive option for Paris 
if it wanted to throw more political capital 
behind its own interests and be awarded a 
greater leadership role on European defence 
issues in the future. But, to do so, France 
would have to refrain from making uni-
lateral (ad hoc) decisions on defence issues. 
Conclusion 
In summary, it can be stated that the obser-
vations on the future of European defence 
policy contained in the above think tank 
publications, which focus on Poland and 
France, vary considerably. This also applies 
generally to those observations concerned 
with the general challenges and potential 
structural changes of EU defence policy. 
That the European defence debate is simul-
taneously shaped by domestic, integration 
and security policy issues, makes it difficult 
for researchers to analyse the complex 
motivations and options for action of EU 
Member States participating in PESCO. 
However, a review of the above publica-
tions also shows that portrayals of today’s 
most pressing problems and crises are 
largely the same. 
The analysis of the prevailing discourse 
in Poland makes it clear that the debates in 
the Eastern and Central European EU Mem-
ber States differ greatly from those in West-
ern Europe, drawing on the example of 
France in this case. The Polish assessment 
of joint defence efforts is more critical and 
detached – an observation that applies to 
all the articles discussed. This scepticism is 
prevalent despite Warsaw benefitting politi-
cally from the new initiatives in many 
ways, both at national and European level. 
Despite these reservations, the Polish gov-
ernment announced at the end of 2018 
that it intended to participate in the second 
round of PESCO projects, albeit only to a 
limited extent. Terlikowski and Muti, in 
particular, have pointed out that the imple-
mentation of PESCO gives Poland the oppor-
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tunity to assume the role of an important 
mediator, acting, on the one hand, between 
Western and Eastern EU Member States 
and, on the other hand, as an advocate of 
meaningful complementarity between EU 
and NATO requirements – with Warsaw 
certainly advocating the primacy of the 
latter. 
All the authors cited here, who have 
looked at France’s defence interests, agree 
that Paris would be well advised to act in 
a less isolated manner and instead seek a 
joint approach with Germany and Poland, 
in order to make PESCO a successful proj-
ect. However, this presupposes a common 
strategy across the EU which would have 
to reflect a balance between all of Europe’s 
overarching geostrategic interests. As the 
above articles have made clear, the French 
government has a number of options avail-
able to shape its defence policy. It can 
choose between bilateral agreements on 
arms projects as well as political and mili-
tary cooperation formats. Paris has revealed 
its preference for bilateral and ad hoc for-
mats that do not necessarily have to be part 
of the EU framework. This could open up 
new opportunities to integrate the UK into 
a future European security and defence 
architecture, an aspect most writers include 
in their observations in the run-up to Brexit 
slated for 29 March 2019. 
Summarising the analyses and comments 
discussed, France sees itself as a driving force 
in the development of a European defence 
policy, but is not afraid to potentially irri-
tate other Member States with its discourse 
on strategic autonomy of the EU and the 
EI2 initiative it has promoted. 
These presented analyses of France’s 
motives and Poland’s criticism and ambi-
valent behaviour on matters of European 
defence policy should be carefully noted in 
Berlin. Germany should be looking to take 
charge of the task of balancing the diverg-
ing geostrategic interests between the East 
and the West of the EU, thereby bringing 
its own interests into the debate. In other 
words, Berlin should increasingly take on 
the role of mediator itself. However, Ger-
many will have to reckon with criticism 
from France and Poland if it takes on this 
function (see analyses by Gotkowska and 
Kunz), because its neighbours to the east 
and west have repeatedly said they consider 
the Bundeswehr’s resources inadequate and 
Germany’s reluctance to engage in crisis 
management casts doubt on the credibility 
of German promises. It is not only the 
authors of the articles discussed here who 
believe Berlin should become more involved 
in defence issues and, therefore, assume 
more responsibility. German researchers, 
such as Major and Mölling (2017, see Fur-
ther Reading), come to similar conclusions. 
What this means for PESCO is that, in 
developing a European “strategic culture”, 
Germany runs the risk of neglecting its own 
interests if it does not proactively contrib-
ute to shaping this defence policy initiative. 
The absence of a common strategic approach 
is seen by most authors as problematic for 
the further development of a pan-European 
defence policy. Similar views are shared by 
other European ‘think tankers’ researching 
PESCO. In addition to the strategy issue, 
Blockmans (2018, see Further Reading), for 
example, sees further challenges for PESCO 
that policymakers will have to resolve in 
the near future. These include compelling 
and binding rules on the implementation 
of the PESCO framework in and for the par-
ticipating states, agreeing on ambitious 
goals whilst maintaining an inclusive and 
integrative approach, and ensuring PESCO 
is compatible with other defence structures 
in Europe. If these issues remain unresolved, 
the success of PESCO could be in jeopardy, 
especially if current trends in Warsaw 
(strong US focus) and Paris (tendency to-
wards unilateral ad hoc formats) intensify. 
The literature referred to in this Journal 
Review of the European defence debate not 
only highlights policy recommendations 
that directly affect Warsaw and Paris, but 
also expresses, either implicitly or explicitly, 
the authors’ concrete expectations of Ber-
lin. Against the background of the current 
policy and research debates, the Federal 
Government must ultimately ask itself what 
kind of defence policy does Berlin want for 
Germany – and also Europe –, and how 
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might the vision of a ‘European Defence 
Union’ and a ‘European Army’ – both of 
which still require legal and political under-
pinning (cf. Wolfstädter 2018, see Further 
Reading) – still be realised despite the cur-
rent differences that persist among EU 
Member States. 
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